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OPINION PIECE
TAKING RESPONSIBILITY
Robert M. Ackerman*
Communitarians have suggested that a balance
must be struck between individual rights and the public
welfare, and that our self-seeking tendencies must some-
times be set aside in pursuit of the common good. Govern-
ment is often (although not always) the mechanism through
which common interests are advanced. An abdication of
government responsibility may result in disaster, as was the
case with respect to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.
At the other extreme, the accumulation of too much power
in government can also bring about catastrophic conse-
quences, as in the case of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant
disaster in the Soviet Union. A balance must be struck
between the extremes of government passivity and "all
government, all the time. " Traditionally, this tension has
been framed as one of libertarianism versus collectivism; in
current American political parlance, that of liberalism
versus conservatism. But communitarians are more likely
to view these issues in terms of an adjustment of interests,
to be determined in the political arena, than as a clash of
rights, to be adjudicated in the courtroom. This essay sug-
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania
State University; B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank Kathryn Mason and Joel Samuels for their
invaluable research assistance. The author also wishes to thank Amitai
Etzioni, Hans Joas, Bodo von Greiff, Wolfgang Muller, and Wibren
van der Burg for their comments and encouragement. Earlier versions
of this essay appeared on the Communitarian Network webpage avail-
able at
http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/WinnerofCommunitarianEssayContest.htm
and in German translation sub nom Verantwortung iibernehman,
2/2007 Leviathan 143.
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gests a communitarian framework for analyzing the boun-
daries of government power and responsibility.
Part I of the essay focuses on the Katrina disaster
and the abdication of government responsibility on the
local, state, and national levels both before and after the
hurricane.
Part II suggests the Chernobyl experience as a
counterpoint, cautioning us regarding the dangers of too
much government control.
Part III explores the underlying attitudes toward
government in the United States, suggesting that hostility
toward government has resulted in a "tragedy of the com-
mons" that undermines the public welfare.
Part IV outlines a series of communitarian guide-
lines for principled consideration of the proper role of
government.
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. DELUGE AND DELUSION.
A. Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans?1
On Monday, August 29, 2005, at 6:10 a.m. Central
Daylight Time, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of
the United States, with the center of the storm making land-
fall a few miles east of New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina
had been a Category 5 hurricane while in the Gulf.2 Its
intensity had diminished to Category 4 and then to a strong
Category 3 hurricane (with maximum sustained winds of
175 miles per hour) by the time it reached Louisiana and
Mississippi. 3 But Katrina's wind speed (the basis of its
numerical classification) told only part of the story. By any
measure, Hurricane Katrina was an exceptionally large
storm. Hurricane-force winds extended about 100 statute
miles away from her center, and tropical storm-force winds
4
extended about 230 miles away.
The residents of the Gulf States had been warned
for several days about Katrina's imminent landfall, but it
was not until 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 28, that New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin saw fit to order the first-ever
mandatory evacuation of the city. As a consequence, when
the hurricane struck, "[a]pproximately one-fifth of New
Orleans's 460,000 residents were still in the city, and a
similar proportion were left in each of the surrounding
parishes (approximately 900,000 people lived in these sub-
urbs)."5 Katrina's winds caused some destruction (includ-
ing tearing a hole in the roof of the Louisiana Superdome,
1 LOUIS ARMSTRONG, Do You KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO MIss NEW
ORLEANS? (Bluebird RCA 1946).
2 RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL RE-
PORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Aug. 2005).3 id.
4 Id. at 1-4, 23-30.
5 DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA,
NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MississiPPi GULF COAST 89-90 (2006).
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where thousands of residents had taken shelter), but the
greatest devastation in New Orleans and elsewhere was a
consequence of the storm surge caused by the hurricane.
The Gulf of Mexico, Lake Pontchartrain, and a system of
rivers and connecting canals overflowed their banks and
breached the levees protecting New Orleans (much of
which lies below sea-level) and the surrounding communi-
ties from their waters. Low-lying neighborhoods in New
Orleans, the surrounding communities, and coastal areas in
Mississippi and Alabama were inundated and remained
underwater for several days. Thousands of citizens were
left stranded, or worse, drowned in the floodwaters. Their
desperation was exacerbated by what appeared to be an
utter breakdown of emergency rescue operations. State,
local, and national officials lacked organization, supplies
failed to reach their destinations, and public transportation
out of the city failed to materialize until several days after
the storm. New Orleans' predicament took on racial over-
tones, as a disproportionately large number of its stranded
residents were African-American. The loss of life, damage
to property, and overall devastation of New Orleans and
other parts of the Central Gulf Coast amounted to the worst
natural catastrophe in the history of the United States. The
tragedy painted a disturbing picture of disparity between
rich and poor, white and black, and a governing apparatus
that was too paralyzed to provide effective relief to belea-
guered citizens.
The floodwaters had not receded before the finger-
pointing began. Katrina was a natural disaster, but there
was a pervasive sense that the tragedy was unnecessarily
compounded by human failure. Hurricane Katrina would
raise anew questions about the role of government and
civic responsibility in America, issues of ongoing interest
to communitarians. The events surrounding Katrina sug-
gested serious lapses in areas of official responsibility at
several junctures, both before and after the storm. A few
prominent examples are as follows:
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* Years of dredging by the United States Army Corps
of Engineers had kept the Mississippi River open
for shipping. It had also removed millions of tons
of silt necessary to replenish the wetlands of the
Mississippi River Delta. Petroleum exploration had
caused more subsidence, further compromising the
wetlands. As a consequence, Louisiana lost 1900
square miles of wetlands between 1930 and 2004.6
The wetlands had acted as a natural sponge, absorb-
ing storm surges and protecting New Orleans and
other populated areas. With this natural sponge se-
verely eroded, almost nothing could absorb Katri-
na's storm surge before it struck the populated areas
of the Gulf Coast. Additionally, subsidence re-
duced the heights of the levees by as much as three
feet below their original design.7
" Further damage to the wetlands was caused by the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR. GO), a canal
completed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1960s. 8
MR. GO also acted as a funnel for water being
forced up toward the city, leading to the breaches
that would cause massive flooding in New Orleans'
Lower Ninth Ward.9
" Levees constructed by the Corps of Engineers to
protect New Orleans from flooding were reinforced
by sheet piles consisting of interlocking steel sup-
6 Joel K. Boume, Jr., Gone with the Water, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
2004, at 88.
7 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF
THE NEW ORLEANS AND SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE
PROTECTION SYSTEM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-4 (June 1,2006).
8 Joel K. Bourne, Jr., New Orleans: A Perilous Future, NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC, Aug. 2007, available at
http://ngn-nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0708/feature1/index.ht ml.
9Id.
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ports.10 An investigation subsequent to Katrina has
shown that the sheet piles "were too shallow to pre-
vent [a] flow" of water underneath them.1 "Tests.
. found that sheet piles reached only 10 feet below
sea level in some spots, far less than would protect
the city.' 12 The Corps' designs had called "for a
depth of 171 feet, but even that, the investigators
say, would have been too shallow."' 13 "[I]n spots
where the levees" were subsequently repaired, the
Corps of Engineers called "for sheet piles to be dri-
ven to depths of 51 to 65 feet."' 4 Soil material in-
corporated into the levees was also found
inadequate for the circumstances. 15  The levees
therefore lacked adequate foundation support.
While Katrina's storm surge would have crested the
levees in any event, the waters would have likely
receded without serious flooding had the levees re-
mained intact. Lacking adequate support, however,
the levees gave way, causing several New Orleans
neighborhoods (in particular, the predominately
African-American Lower Ninth Ward) to be inun-
dated with water. Not long before the storm, a re-
quest for $105 million to improve the levee system
had been reduced by the administration of President
George W. Bush to $40 million, despite re eated
warnings regarding the region's vulnerability.
'0 John Schwartz & Christopher Drew, Louisiana's Levee Inquiry
Faults Army Corps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A28.ll Id.
12 Id
13 1d.
1 4
1d.
15 INDEPENDENT LEVEE INVESTIGATION TEAM, UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA
AT BERKELEY, NEW ORLEANS SYSTEMS HURRICANE KATRINA XVIII
APP. AT 1-7 (2006).16 Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2005, at A21.
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" The levees were subject to a confusing and ineffi-
cient administrative structure. A tangled web of lo-
cal authorities, often preoccupied with unrelated
projects, shared authority over the levees with the
Corps of Engineers. Responsibility was fragmented
and unclear. With so many in charge, nobody was
really in charge. The various structures built to con-
tain hurricanes did not function as a system and
lacked redundancy. Compromises in one part of the
"system" produced by political forces or environ-
mental concerns were not compensated for else-
where, where other agencies might be in control.
* Global warming may have played a role in Katri-
na's having become such a powerful storm. "[S]ea
surface temperature records show that the oceans
[and other large bodies of water (like the Gulf of
Mexico)] are more than 1 degree F[ahrenheit] war-
mer on average today to a century ago." 17 "Because
hurricanes draw strength from heat in ocean surface
waters," warmer water potentially "generate[s]
more powerful hurricanes."1 8  Water temperatures
fluctuate in any event, "[b]ut the higher the average
[temperature,] the more likely the water will be
warm enough to produce a strong storm on any giv-
en day during the hurricane season." 19 So while we
cannot say with any assurance that global warming
caused Katrina, the probability of severe hurricanes
like Katrina was significantly enhanced by global
warming. This idea may help explain why, for the
first time, the Tropical Prediction Center (the agen-
17 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Katrina and Global Warm-
ing: Was Katrina's Power a Product of Global Warming?, available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreports/katrina.cfm (last visited Aug.
23, 2007).
18id.
19Id.
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cy that assigns names to hurricanes) ran all the way
through the alphabet in 2005.20
While public authorities had ample warning of Hur-
ricane Katrina, they failed to mobilize a transport
system equal to the need for evacuation. Many of
the poor residents of the region (and in particular
the poor African-American residents of the region)
lacked automobiles of their own. These people
were dependent upon public transportation to leave
the city.21 Little, if any such transportation materia-
lized. Two days before the hurricane, Amtrak
routes that normally serve New Orleans were termi-
nated in Memphis and Atlanta.22 (French tourists
stranded in New Orleans before the storm went in-
stinctively to the railroad station and were bewil-
20 Hurricane names are agreed upon at international meetings of the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and once a storm system
with counterclockwise circulation reaches wind speeds of thirty-nine
miles per hour or greater, the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) in
Miami, Florida, assigns the system one of the pre-determined names.
National Hurricane Center, Naming Hurricanes, available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/basics/naming.shtml (last
visited June 26, 2007). The most active hurricane season, prior to
2005, was in 1933 when the season produced twenty-one named tropi-
cal cyclones; in 2005, the season produced twenty-eight named sys-
tems, running the TPC completely through the WMO's alphabetized
list of names and making 2005 the most active season to date. ERIC S.
BLAKE, ET AL., THE DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNIT-
ED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2006 14 (Apr. 2007),
available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/DeadliestCostliest.shtm.
21 Jason DeParle, What Happens to a Race Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, § 4 at 1 (reporting that even among the poor in New Orleans,
African-Americans were less likely than whites to own automobiles)
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/weekinreview/04depa.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2008).
22 Amtrak, Service Alert: Hurricane Katrina Update, available at
http://www. amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2
Copy/SimpleCopy_.Popup&c=am2Copy&cid=1093554014709 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008).
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dered to find it closed.23) Hundreds of the city's
school buses remained in their parking lots; these
buses became disabled when the lots were
24flooded. The City ordered an evacuation, but
made no provision to assist residents in evacuation
efforts. Indeed, buses out of the city did not mate-
rialize for several days after the hurricane struck.25
With 30% of National Guard units tied up in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the White House claiming ig-
norance of severe flooding until several days after
the storm, the federal government was slow to mo-
26bilize for an evacuation.
Government on all levels (i.e., the city, the state,
and the federal government) was particularly impo-
tent when it came to providing aid to people in the
beleaguered area after the hurricane hit. Those
stranded in New Orleans were told to report to the
Louisiana Superdome, where they would find pro-
visions. As many as 50,000 people heeded that call,
only to find a facility that was ill-prepared to ac-
commodate them.27 The hurricane caused a power
outage, and with it, the absence of air-conditioning,
leaving people to bake in the Louisiana heat while
trapped inside the indoor stadium. 28 Basic sanita-
tion soon broke down in the huge facility. Reports
23 Dan Baum, New Orleans Postcard: Consulat DInfluence, THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 30. This episode illustrates a major differ-
ence between American and European expectations regarding public
transportation.
24 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 359.25 /d. at 386.
26 Julian Borger & Duncan Campbell, Why Did Help Take So Long to
Arrive?, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 3, 2005, at 4.
27 See Robert Tanner, Thousands Evacuated from New Orleans Satur-
day, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.wwlt v.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/katrina/stories/0903
05ccKatrinawcMainstory. I f76bb86.html.
28 BRiNKLEY, supra note 5, at 191-93.
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of assaults, rapes, and even murders were rampant;
while most of these reports were later discredited, a
sense of anarchy was prevalent.29 Several thousand
additional victims sought refuge in New Orleans'
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, from which
reports of anarchy surpassed those coming from the
Superdome. (At least one confirmed murder did
occur at the Convention Center .30) Anarchy was al-
so evident in the streets of New Orleans, where
many business establishments fell victim to loo-
ters. 3 1  Some of these "looters" could hardly be
blamed, as they were procuring food, water, and
other supplies necessary to sustain the stranded
32population.
" Other aspects of the rescue, such as relief for vic-
tims stranded in the floodwaters, were similarly dis-
organized. Approximately one-third of the mem-
bers of the New Orleans Police Department de-
serted their posts. 33 National Guard units were slow
in coming; the efforts of these and other law en-
forcement officials who arrived from as far away as
Oregon and Puerto Rico were uncoordinated, lack-
ing any central command.34 Some of the law en-
forcement units seemed more intent on quelling
non-existent rioting than on providing relief to flood
victims.
35
* In at least one instance, citizens of New Orleans
found themselves to be victims of bad neighbors.
29 Id. at 193, 240, 476.
30 Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Reports of Anarchy at Superdome
Overstated, SEATTLE TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al.
31 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 200-05, 276.32 Id. passim; Tanner, supra note 27.
33 Dan Baum, Deluged: When Katrina Hit, Where Were the Police?,
THENEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 50, 60.34 Id.
35 id.
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Attempting to leave the stricken city and looking for
high ground, several hundred New Orleans resi-
dents tried crossing the Mississippi to Gretna, Loui-
siana, where they were met by a sheriff's
department intent on turning them back.36 Escape
from the devastated city, even for those willing and
able to walk, was thereby blocked.
B. "It ain't my fault. ,37
The devastation of Hurricane Katrina and its after-
math suggest a natural disaster the consequences of which
were severely exacerbated by an abdication of governmen-
tal responsibility on all levels. That the human failure was
primarily one of government is hard to deny. While indi-
viduals had, to be sure, taken it upon themselves to live in
New Orleans and elsewhere on the Gulf Coast, they did so
in reliance on a system of levees, canals, navigation, and
transportation engineered, built, and maintained primarily
by government. Indeed, only government could have con-
structed and maintained a system of such scale. Yet the
American government, which had, only a few months earli-
er, raced halfway around the world to provide aid for vic-
tims of a giant tsunami, was now found seriously wanting
when faced with a natural disaster at home.
The immediate target of public wrath was Michael
D. Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and a man clearly in over his head. In the days
following Katrina's onslaught, Brown was depicted as
studiously ignorant about the conditions in New Orleans,
more concerned about his attire and dinner schedule than
36 Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse, S.F. CHRON,
Sept. 9, 2005, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file-/c/a2005/09/09/BAGL1EL1 KH1.DTL.
37 SMOKEY JOHNSON, IT AIN'T MY FAULT (Night Train International
2000).
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the coordination of relief for the stricken region. Neverthe-
less, President Bush, in cheerleader mode, proclaimed,
"Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job[!]" as New Orleans
sank into the mire. 38 Shortly thereafter, Brown would find
himself in the position of scapegoat for the muffed opera-
tion, becoming comic fodder for late-night television hosts
in a Warholian moment of infamy. He would resign later
in September, only to establish a business as a disaster
preparedness consultant.
39
But to blame a single individual for the disaster was
to miss the point. Brown was representative of two much
larger phenomena: a diffusion of responsibility among a
patchwork quilt of federal, state, and local authorities; and
an administration in Washington that appeared to be less
than fully committed to some of the most essential func-
tions of government. 40 Evidence of the latter problem had
previously surfaced in connection with the war in Iraq.
While many would come to dispute the need to invade Iraq
in 2003 and to deplore the manipulation of intelligence
used to justify the invasion, few would argue that national
defense is not an essential function of government. Yet
even as it schemed to carry on a war against Iraq, the ad-
ministration failed to adequately equip the military to pro-
ceed with its mission. Military experts lamented the
inadequate number of troops deployed for the mission; the
understaffing violated a core principle of the "Powell Doc-
trine," which espoused the use of force that is "overwhelm-
38 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President
Arrives in Alabama, Briefed on Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 2, 2005),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/O9/2OO50902_2.htm-.
39 Mark Leibovich, A Punch Line Who Refuses to Fade Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, at Al1.
40 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Killed By Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2005, at A21.
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ing and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy., 41
Despite months of planning, soldiers lacked body armor
and other essential equipment.42 Events suggested the
absence of any plan to secure either Iraq's munitions or its
national treasures from looting as the conquest of that
country was completed. The looting in turn helped supply
a protracted insurgency about which the administration had
been warned, but which did not figure into its plans. 43
Even the administration's highest priorities seemed
thwarted by either a lack of foresight or a fundamental
unwillingness to commit public resources to essential func-
tions.
The "less government the better" philosophy of the
Bush Administration-a recurring theme of Republican
Party rhetoric since 1980 44 -resulted in a lack of serious-
41 The Powell Doctrine was espoused by General Colin Powell, while
serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991. Other ele-
ments of the Powell Doctrine: that military action should be used only
as a last resort and only where there was a clear risk to national security
by the intended target; that there must be strong support for the cam-
paign by the general public; and that there must be a clear exit strategy
from the conflict. See Colin Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,
71 FOREIGN AFF. 32 (1992).
42 When the Secretary of Defense was called to account for this, his
response was "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army
you might want or wish to have at a later time." Eric Schmitt, Troops'
Queries Leave Rumsfeld on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at
Al (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld).
43 Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq predicted
insurgency in the wake of the conquest of Iraq. STAFF OF S. SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON PREWAR
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ (Comm. Print
2007), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf.
44 The Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan, elected
in 1980, reduced non-military governmental expenditures, but contin-
ued the military buildup begun by its predecessor. This buildup is
widely credited with ending the Cold War with a Soviet government
that was unable to compete. Jeffrey W. Knopf, Did Reagan Win the
Cold War?, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Aug. 2004, available at
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ness about the responsibilities of government and the staff-
ing of the administration by those, like Mr. Brown, for
whom a government post was a reward for party loyalty
rather than competence, a path to power but not public
service.45  In the conservative catechism, "good govern-
ment" was an oxymoron, so government might as well
serve as an object of plunder, rather than as a form of pub-
lic service.
None of this, however, was likely to surprise propo-
nents of social choice theory. As Professor Frank Michel-
man has explained, social choice theorists explain public
policy choices as manifestations of "no public or general or
social interest,... only concatenations of particular inter-
ests or private preferences., 46  If government was to be
viewed not as an instrument to serve the people, but rather
as an opportunity to advance one's personal interests, it was
easy to see how an agency like FEMA could be trans-
formed into a fiefdom bereft of a long-term plan for disas-
ter response, or for it to engage in what New York Times
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.nilsi/2004/aug/knopfAUG04.pdf. For a
discussion of Soviet failures, see infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
4' The practice was repeated in other sectors of government. Most
notably, staffing at the Justice Department, which traditionally had
been the bailiwick of career professionals, took on a partisan edge
during the administration of George W. Bush. See CQ Transcripts
Wire, Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee, THE
WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-
srv/politics/transcripts/goodlingtestimony_052307.html; Margaret
Talev & Marisa Taylor, U.S. Attorneys Saga Exposes Weakened Justice
Department Independence, THE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 18, 2007,
available at
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssentinel/news/editorial/ 7386647.
htm. Federal legislation prohibits appointment of certain federal em-
ployees on the basis of political affiliation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l)(E)
(2007).
46 Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148 (1977).
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columnist Maureen Dowd called "a chilling lack of empa-
thy combined with a stunning lack of efficiency." 47 Indeed,
the entire Homeland Security apparatus of which FEMA
was a part, conceived as a necessary device to avert future
September 1 1-type disasters, had become, in short order, a
repository for congressional pork barrels, with rural police
and fire departments in favored districts awash in funds
while their urban counterparts (the more likely targets of
future terrorist attacks) struggled to make-do. 48  Mean-
while, the federal government, rather than shrinking in size
(a modest accomplishment of the Clinton Administration)
actually grew, as domestic expenditures, 49 and along with
them, the budget deficit, soared during the first five years
of the George W. Bush presidency. 5 1 As more than one
47 Maureen Dowd, supra note 16, at A2 1.
48 Dean E. Murphy, Security Grants Still Streaming to Rural States,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al. In Katrina's wake, Republican-
governed Mississippi received a disproportionately larger amount of
federal relief than Democratically-governed Louisiana. See Larry
Copeland, In Mississippi, Katrina Recovery Gaining Steam, USA
TODAY, July 24, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-24-miss-
rebuilds-x.htm; Adam Nossiter, Senators at Louisiana Hearing Critic-
ize Federal Recovery Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A16.49 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, 8 TABLE 7
(2006) available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008).
50 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment, Fiscal Year 2007: Summary of Tables 315, Table S-3 (2006)
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/tables.pdf
!last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
1 Belatedly, some Republicans came to lament the Bush Administra-
tion's enlargement of government and Congressional use of budgetary
earmarks. In explaining how the conservative movement has been
undermined, conservative activist Richard Viguerie states,
[Wihen you add everything up, what you have is a
massive overreach of executive powers, and massive
overspending by people who claim they're conservatives.
Every President, with hardly any exceptions, will take as
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wag has noted, "For years, Republicans had told us that
government was bad; when they came to power, they
proved it." As a consequence Americans, who had raced
halfway around the world to aid victims of an Asian tsuna-
mi eight months prior to Katrina, seemed incapable of tak-
ing care of their own when disaster struck the Gulf Coast.
At a Congressional hearing following the Katrina
disaster, FEMA Director Brown alleged that Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray
Nagin (both Democrats) bore most, if not all the blame, for
the failures in the response to Katrina, and that Brown's
own only mistake had been not to realize sooner the
inability of Blanco and Nagin to perform their duties. 52 In
subsequent testimony, Brown blamed the Department of
Homeland Security and his White House patrons-but not
himself-for the federal government's lack of preparation
and its delay in providing relief and rescue. 53  A
Congressional committee, composed entirely of
Republicans, would focus its blame on Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff.54  According to the panel's
chairman, Mr. Chertoff had "primary responsibility for
much power as he gets. That's what Presidents do. Bush
has tried more than most. And it was supposed to be the
Republicans in Congress who would do oversight of the
President, so that he wouldn't get away with too much
abuse of power. But they abdicated that role. It was all
about the maintenance of power, and now look where
they are.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Party Unfaithful: The Republican Implosion, THE
NEW YORKER, June 4, 2007, at 40, 45.52 Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency: H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation
for & Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005)
(testimony of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).53 Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership: S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Feb.
10, 2006) (testimony of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).
54 See Spencer S. Hsu, Katrina Report Spreads Blame: Homeland
Security, Chertoff Singled Out, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at Al.
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managing the national response to a catastrophic disas-
ter,"55 yet, as the committee reported, he had handled his
decision-making responsibilities "late, ineffectively, or not
at all. A Bush Administration report focused on a need
for administrative reorganization that would divide various
functions among several government agencies, some in
different departments-this only a few short years after a
major government reorganization through which the De-
partment of Homeland Security was created.57 A Senate
report subsequent to Katrina recommended abolishing
FEMA and creating another Homeland Security unit, a
"National Preparedness and Response Authority." 58 Ap-
parently, performance would be improved by rearranging
the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Government lapses in connection with Hurricane
Katrina were by no means the exclusive domain of the
Republican Party. Under both major parties, the Corps of
Engineers had developed a reputation for heavy-
handedness, enjoying hegemony over flood control and
paying little heed to the environmental consequences of its
actions, while feeding off pork-barrel appropriations from
Democratic, as well as Republican, Congresses. 59 Katrina
55 Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Securi-
ty: Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (opening
statement of Tom Davis, chairman).56 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT ON THE SELECT BIPARTI-
SAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H. REP. No. 109-377, at 2-3 passim
(2nd Sess. 2006); see Hsu, supra note 54 at Al.
7 George W. Bush Administration, The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned, 65-82 (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf.
58 S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. No. 109-
322, RECOMMENDATIONS 607 (2006).59 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, CROS-
SROADS: CONGRESS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND WASTEFUL WA-
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found Democrats in state and city governments in Louisi-
ana and New Orleans dropping the ball in planning, execu-
tion, and emergency response. Nevertheless, the inept Ray
Nagin would be re-elected as New Orleans' mayor in May
2006, demonstrating the tendency of the electorate to close
ranks around homegrown incompetence.
C. Photo-op politics.
American politicians tend to deal with squeaky-
wheel, crisis-of-the-moment issues that are conducive to
"photo opportunities" and other media coverage, but not to
engage in long-term planning or quiet reflection. Much
like corporate officers whose visions runs only to the end of
the current quarter, politicians tend to address the hot-
button issue of the day, with their responses tailored to
exploit whatever momentary political advantage can be
obtained, rather than taking a long view of the public inter-
est. Be it the devastation of Katrina, a coal mine disaster
that takes a dozen lives, 60 or even a professional quarter-
TER PROJECTS 2-3 (2000), available at
http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/Crossroads.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2008).
60 Representative of this behavior was the response to the Sago Mine
disaster in January 2006, which took the lives of twelve miners. Ian
Urbina & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. Is Reducing Safety Penalties for
Mine Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al "[T]he operator [of the
Sago Mine] had been cited 273 times since 2004. None of the fines,
[however,] exceeded $460." Id. The New York Times reported that this
was typical of the pattem of reduced mine safety enforcement by the
Bush Administration, which, even after imposing fines far smaller than
the maximum allowable, was lax in their collection. Id. The Congres-
sional response was to introduce legislation to increase the maximum
fines allowable, not to demand better enforcement of existing law. Id.
Lest one surmise that the Bush Administration's tendency to compro-
mise with mine operators reflected the needs of a struggling industry,
one should note that the International Coal Group, which operates the
Sago Mine, reported $110 million in net profits during 2005. Id.
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back's involvement in a dog fighting ring,6' the typical
legislative response is a predictable one: press conferences,
legislative hearings, grandstanding, and still more legisla-
tion, rather than effective oversight regarding implementa-
tion of legislation already in effect. The Bush
Administration may have been derelict in attending to dis-
aster relief after Katrina, but it retained enough media
savvy to stage a dramatically-lit and heavily scripted Presi-
dential television address from Jackson Square in New
Orleans a few days after the storm.
That publicity-mongering and point-scoring is a bi-
partisan affair that can be demonstrated by the grandstand-
ing that attended the arrival of $3 per gallon gasoline prices
in the spring of 2006. Democrats were eager to blame the
cost of gas (still substantially less than what Europeans
were accustomed to paying) on price-gouging by the oil
companies and the short-sightedness of the Bush Adninis-
tration and to urge adoption of deficit enhancement meas-
ures such as "a sixty-day halt on collecting federal gasoline
taxes." 62 The Bush Administration, in a conspiracy with
Big Oil, was depriving Americans of their God-given right
to drive, and there were political points to be scored.
Meanwhile, Republican leaders proposed a $100-per-driver
tax rebate,63 presumably to be financed by more federal
61 A more recent example of Congressional grandstanding was Senator
John Kerry's pledge to introduce tougher federal legislation to ban dog
fighting. Senator Kerry's pledge came in the wake of revelations of a
dog-fighting ring that included Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael
Vick, who eventually pled guilty to federal charges. See Senator John
Kerry's Online Office, Kerry Asks NFL Commissioner to Immediately
Suspend Vick Over "Sickening" Dogfighting Case, July 20, 2007,
http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=279464.
62 Edmund L. Andrews & Michael Janofsky, Second Thoughts in
Congress on Oil Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at Al.
63 Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, Domenici Introduces the Gas Price and Rebate Act of
2006 (Apr. 27, 2006) available at
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
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borrowing from East Asian banks. 64 "'Political anxiety in
an election year is to blame for a lot of the bad bills Con-
gress passes,' said Representative Jeff Flake," an Arizona
Republican who opposed this short-lived proposal. 65 Lead-
ers of neither major party took pains to point out the need
to develop a real national energy policy, to promote con-
servation (and with it, public transportation), and to invest
in alternative sources of energy-in other words, anything
requiring planning or sacrifice on the part of the American
people.
66
This infantile attitude toward governance seeks re-
fuge in "painless" solutions, in which constituents are
treated not as citizens, but consumers; not as responsible
participants in a common enterprise, but as supplicants
hoping to feed from a public trough. Rather than demand
of the American public, as President Kennedy did, that we
"ask not what [our] country can do for [us], but what [we]
can do for [our] country,",67 present-day politicians ask
Americans to consider whether we are "better off now than
Detail&PressReleaseid=234941 &Month=4&Year=2006&Party= 1
2ast visited Feb. 4, 2008).
See U.S. Treasury Department, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury
Securities (May. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. (charting major foreign holders of
treasury securities from November 2006 to November 2007).
65 Carl Hulse et al., Republicans Drop a Tax Plan After Business Lead-
ers Protest, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at Al.
66 Lamenting the "utterly shameless, utterly over-the-top Republican
pandering and Democratic point-scoring that have been masquerading
as governing in response to this energy crisis," New York Times col-
umnist Thomas Friedman called for the creation of a third political
party because neither major party is willing to tell Americans what they
need to hear: that a solution "requires sacrifice today for gain tomor-
row." Thomas L. Friedman, Let's (Third) Party, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2006, at A25.
67 President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
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we were four years ago." 68 War is waged in Iraq, for a
number of reasons, some justified, some contrived, but
instead of urging us to shared sacrifice, the administration
and Congress rewards us (or at least the most affluent
among us) with tax reductions. Pork barrel expenditures-
not for improved levees in New Orleans, but for bridges to
nowhere in Alaska-grow to budget-busting proportions
through an undemocratic "earmarking" process, all to be
financed not through user fees or taxes, but through the
blue smoke and mirrors of supply-side economics and fan-
ciful growth projections. In the days following Katrina's
onslaught, Thomas Friedman observed,
Besides ripping away the roofs of New Or-
leans, Katrina ripped away the argument that
we can cut taxes, properly educate our kids,
compete with India and China, succeed in Iraq,
keep improving the U.S. infrastructure, and
take care of a catastrophic emergency - without
putting ourselves totally into the debt of Bei-
jing.
So many of the things the Bush team
has ignored or distorted under the guise of
fighting Osama were exposed by Katrina: its
refusal to impose a gasoline tax after 9/11,
which would have begun to shift our economy
much sooner to more fuel-efficient cars, helped
raise money for a rainy day and eased our de-
pendence on the world's worst regimes for
energy; its refusal to develop some form of na-
tional health care to cover the 40 million unin-
sured; and its insistence on cutting more taxes,
even when that has contributed to incomplete
68 Soon to be President, Ronald Reagan, asked Americans to consider,
"whether you are better off today than four years ago." President
Ronald Reagan, Reagan-Carter Presidential Debate (Oct. 28, 1980).
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levees and too small an Army to deal with Ka-
trina, Osama and Saddam at the same time.
69
Critics of the war in Iraq have complained that it
has left the American military stretched too thin.70 But the
stretch is not beyond that which we are capable; it is simply
beyond that which we have been willing to commit.
71
Today's global military commitments are fulfilled not by
sons and daughters drafted from the citizenry-at-large, but
by an "all-volunteer" army, consisting primarily of low-
income people with few economic alternatives, gleaned
from America's urban ghettoes and rural communities.72 A
less populous, less affluent United States of America was
able to stretch its military around the globe during World
War II, but that was an enterprise to which the nation was
fully committed, for which the administration in power had
prepared the American people to sacrifice, and in which
most American families had a direct stake, often through
one or more of its members in military service. Americans
would have been similarly disposed to sacrifice after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But instead of
imploring us to shared sacrifice, the President told Ameri-
cans to "live your lives and hug your children., 73 The tax
breaks and pork-barrel expenditures continued. A critic of
69 Thomas L. Friedman, Osama and Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2005, at A25.70 See generally LYNN E. DAVIS, ET AL., STRETCHED THIN: ARMY
FORCES FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS (2005) (prepared for the United
States Army).
71 This lack of commitment may find its roots in the omission of Powell
Doctrine principles from war planning. See generally Powell, supra
note 41.
72 The army's current recruiting slogan, An Army of One, hardly brings
to mind the more communitarian, brothers-in-arms philosophy of what
Tom Brokaw and others have called "the Greatest Generation."
73 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001).
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the Bush Administration captured its post-September 11
attitude with the words, "We're at war. Let's party!" 74
Granted, it is difficult for a president to tell the
American people that it is time for us to eat our vegetables.
But we have gorged on a diet of sweets and fats for too
long. Indeed, the recent upswing in obesity among Ameri-
cans, young and old-and with it, the growth in related
maladies such as diabetes and heart disease-is an apt
metaphor for our debt-plagued government and society. 75
The time has come for all of us to take responsibility.
II. COUNTERPOINT: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER.
A. A nuclear whirlwind.
In the context of responsible governing, Katrina
was, both literally and figuratively, a reaping of the whirl-
wind. Poor planning and neglect had come home to roost
in the flooded streets of New Orleans in a visible, demon-
74 Friedman, supra note 66 (referring to a statement by Joel Hyatt).
Conservative activist Richard Viguerie has pointed out that Bush has
followed in the "guns-and-butter" footsteps of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, abjuring the approach of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry S. Truman, and Ronald Reagan, who cut discretionary domestic
spending as they increased defense spending. RICHARD A. VIGUERIE,
CONSERVATIVES BETRAYED 25 (2006).
75 An article by Jackson Lears espouses this concept.
Americans are awash in red ink. Consumer indebtedness
is soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are
filing for bankruptcy at record rates. To many observers,
these are symptoms of cultural decline, from sturdy thrift
to flabby self-gratification--embodied in the current ob-
esity epidemic. The fattest nation on earth is also the
greediest consumer of global resources and now is bor-
rowing more than ever to satisfy its appetites.
Jackson Lears, The Way We Live Now: The American Way of Debt,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., June 11,2006, at 13. The article goes on to
suggest that commentators have historically lamented Americans'
tendency toward indebtedness. Id. at 13-16.
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strable way. Were the solution to dysfunctional govern-
ment simply more government, or the consolidation of
power in a single, central government, the remedy could be
derived fairly easily, but solutions to complex problems are
seldom this facile. The past century has provided many
lessons regarding the danger of imposing an all-powerful
government as alpha and omega of all matters. Few were
as vivid as the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster, which
rocked the Soviet Union in April 1986. The explosion at
the nuclear facility near the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl
immediately killed thirty-one people, required the evacua-
tion of 135,000 others, and contaminated an area roughly
the size of England.76 The precise number of cancers and
other illnesses attributable to the disaster will never be
ascertained, but the numbers are probably in the thousands,
with genetic damage possibly being passed down through
several generations. A United Nations report issued in the
fall of 2005 suggested that 4,000 people would, in the end,
die from diseases caused by direct exposure to the radia-
tion.77 Greenpeace, an environmental group not immune
from the use of hyperbole, released its own response in
April 2006 (twenty years after the explosion), claiming that
in the final analysis Chernobyl would kill at least 90,000.78
Chernobyl was the product of a centrally planned
economy in which the government based in Moscow was
the first and last authority. Without private enterprise, a
free press, or internal checks and balances to constrain it,
there was nothing to prevent the Soviet state from engaging
7 6 NEA COMMITTEE ON RADIATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, CHERNOBYL
TEN YEARS ON RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH IMPACT 18, 27-28 (1995),
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/chemobyl/vrml/chemobyl.htnl.
77 Press Release, World Health Org., et al., Chernobyl: The True Scale
of the Accident (Sept. 5, 2005).
78 GREENPEACE, THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE: CONSEQUENCES ON
HUMAN HEALTH 23 (I. Blokov et al. eds., 2006), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/intemational/press/reports/cher
nobylhealthreport.pdf.
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in a reckless course of action. The state could do no
wrong; there was nobody to compete with it, nobody to
criticize it, no mechanism to check its excesses.79 Marx
and Engels had instructed us that in time, the state would
just wither away; in the meantime, it imposed a structure
that dominated human endeavor to a greater degree than
anything mankind had previously seen, with a death grip
that stifled initiative, ambition, and progress.
To be sure, Chernobyl was not the only disaster
caused by Soviet-style totalitarianism. The Soviet inva-
sions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), Sta-
lin's massacre of the kulaks, and the repression of the
Gulag were among hundreds of examples of the excesses of
the Soviet state. But Chernobyl demonstrated that Soviet-
style totalitarianism was not even technically competent.
Military parity with the West would, for a time, mask the
Soviet Empire's economic weakness, but the Chernobyl
disaster revealed that even the vaunted Soviet nuclear pro-
gram was a fagade covering a flawed and creaky infrastruc-
ture. The "workers' paradise" promised by Lenin and
Stalin spewed forth not only the devastation of Chernobyl
but also the environmental wasteland that covered much of
Eastern Europe and Russia by the time of the Soviet Em-
pire's demise circa 1990. If the Katrina disaster presents a
sorry case of abdication of government responsibility, the
Chemobyl catastrophe stands as a harsh illustration of what
can occur when a society and its economy are characterized
by "all government, all the time."
79 The regulatory process in the United States is not without its critics.
But the worst American nuclear plant mishap, Three Mile Island in
1979, paled in comparison to the Chemobyl disaster. Just one year
after the Three Mile Island incident, the author moved to a location just
twenty-five miles upwind of Three Mile Island, where he and his fami-
ly have enjoyed a healthy portion of their lives. For all its shortcom-
ings, a combination of private enterprise and government regulation
appears to have averted more serious nuclear disasters.
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In Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, contemporary
observers saw Chernobyl as a clear signal that the Soviet
Union was not the technological powerhouse it had been
assumed to be. The nuclear plant disaster humbled the
Kremlin and emboldened those who would challenge the
Soviet Empire, causing it to topple within a few short years.
Similarly, in the aftermath of Katrina, people in the United
States and abroad came to wonder whether the world's only
remaining global superpower had the will as well as the
wherewithal to confront serious domestic challenges.
Chernobyl exposed raw the shortcomings of a "people's
dictatorship" that was more bluff than substance; in Katri-
na's aftermath, Americans could not help but wonder
whether we had lost the ability to take care of our own.
The Soviet experience demonstrated the danger of too
much government; the American that of not enough. In
both cases, disaster revealed underlying flaws in governing
philosophy. In both Moscow and Washington, the same
truth was exposed: the emperor had no clothes.
We hesitate to paint with too broad a brush. There
are nuances that work against our grand theory. Critics of
the United States Army Corps of Engineers have long
complained about that agency's unfettered hegemony over
flood control. 80 The single-mindedness of the Corps' un-
dertakings, often oblivious to environmental consequences,
was more reminiscent of the blinders-on mentality of the
Soviet management philosophy than the chaotic misma-
nagement displayed by other American government agen-
cies in Katrina's immediate aftermath. And while the
governments of New Orleans, Louisiana, and the United
States may have failed Katrina's victims, they were gene-
rously assisted by governments in other states, most nota-
bly Texas, which housed thousands of homeless people and
opened the schoolhouse doors to their children. Americans
80 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, Supra
note 59.
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also responded admirably to Katrina through non-
governmental efforts, raising disaster relief funds and vo-
lunteering in large numbers to aid the victims and rebuild
the Gulf Coast. 81  Indeed, the very existence of several
layers of responders, some public, some private, assured
that some relief would arrive for Katrina's beleaguered
victims. Two centuries ago, Alexis DeToqueville observed
that Americans had constructed a strong civil society to
compensate for the weakness of their government.82 That
structure has provided a measure of salvation in the wake
of Katrina and other demands to which our governments,
federal, state, and local, have been slow to respond.
While the Soviet government's initial reaction to
Chemobyl was the sort of tight-lipped non-disclosure cha-
racteristic of a totalitarian regime, Moscow's long-term
response was somewhat more enlightened and humane than
that which one might expect from an "evil empire." Within
a few days after the explosion, the Soviet government or-
dered and conducted mass evacuations and provided the
means for people to leave the contaminated area and to
sustain their lives thereafter. In so doing, it undertook a
81 Particularly noteworthy were the efforts of the Mormon Church,
which quickly sped supplies and relief workers to the beleaguered Gulf
Coast. The Mormon Church-in its ability to mobilize its members for
the common good-demonstrates some of the finest aspects of civil
society. See All About Mormons, Mormon Humanitarian Efforts,
available at
http://www.allaboutmormons.com/mormon-humanitarian-service.php
(last visited June 26, 2007). The church's critics would say that it also
displays communitarian's darker side, with evidence of strong out-
group antagonisms. That is far more likely to have been true in the past
than the present. See Douglas 0. Linder, The Mountain Meadows
Massacre of 1857 and the Trials of John D. Lee: An Account (2006),
available at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/lee
account.html.
82 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA passim (Ge-
rald Bevan trans., Penguin Books Ltd. 2003).
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role not regarded as extraordinary for a socialist state. In
the cases of both Katrina and Chernobyl, problems result-
ing, at least in part, from either an excess or lack of gov-
ernment involvement were ameliorated through more
communitarian solutions: in one case, the compassionate
ministries of civil society and private charity; in the other,
the distributive justice philosophy of a socialist state. In
the end, our salvation lies in neither over-dependency on
government nor the abandonment of government responsi-
bility, but rather somewhere in the middle. 83
B. Averting Collapse.
In his excellent book, Collapse, Jared Diamond de-
scribes the sad fate of several of the world's civilizations,
each of which ultimately failed to thrive because of an
unwise allocation of limited resources. 84 Diamond
attributes societal collapse to a number of factors, including
environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbors,
decreased support by friendly neighbors, and society's
response to environmental problems. 85 He acknowledges
that much environmental degradation is natural or inadver-
tent, but that it is the variable of human response that can
spell the difference between a society that disintegrates and
one that continues to thrive. 86 Diamond documents how in
environments as diverse as Easter Island and Norse Green-
83 Indeed, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Empire was neither as monolith-
ic nor as autocratic as it had once seemed. Nikita Khrushchev's "gou-
lash communism" was evolving into Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost
and, ultimately perestroika. The meltdown of autocracy had begun
prior to the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, although the potency of
civil society in opposition to totalitarian government was more evident
in Warsaw Pact states such as Hungary and Poland than in the Soviet
Union itself.84 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR
SUCCEEDpassim (2005).85 id.
86 id.
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land, ruling elites commandeered scarce resources for
themselves, neglecting the people without whose labor and
support the enterprise was doomed.87 As a consequence, it
was only a matter of time before resources ran dry and the
civilization collapsed. 88 The theory that collapse (or, in
less extreme cases, major economic deprivation) was not an
inevitable consequence of natural conditions is demonstrat-
ed by the differing fortunes of two peoples or political
systems inhabiting the same environment, such as the
Norse and Inuit in Greenland, or the Dominican Republic
and Haiti on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. 89
A relatively small, elite group might temporarily
thrive by hoarding resources and exploiting the populace.
For a time, less fortunate people will perform menial jobs,
serve in an "all volunteer" army, pledge fealty to a "work-
er's paradise," and pay taxes in the forlorn hope that they,
too, will someday share in the community's wealth. But
faith in the community and participation in the common
enterprise ultimately collapses unless the community is
reasonably responsive to the needs of all. Even Machiavel-
li recognized that "[a] wise prince will establish institutions
that can protect lives and property, respect different spheres
of social organization, and help his subjects pursue their
livelihoods." 90 Benjamin Franklin put it more colloquially
during the American Revolution: "We must indeed all hang
together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately."
91
87 id.
88 id.
89 id.
9 0 JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN
IDEA 58 (1999). Ehrenberg offers the following quotation from Ma-
chiavelli's The Prince: "A prince should also show his esteem for
talent, actively encouraging able men, and honoring those who excel in
their profession." Id.
91 Benjamin Franklin, Remarks at the signing of the Declaration of
Independence (July 4, 1776). See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUO-
TATIONS 323 (Elizabeth Knowles ed. 1999).
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Ultimately, we are all in the same boat. Better for us to all
row together to safety than to drop our oars and cannibalize
the weakest among us.
92
That is not to say that we all should be strapped into
our seats, beating out a cadence of strokes called out by a
single coxswain seated up front. The failure of commun-
ism has demonstrated how a centrally-controlled economy,
answering to the beat of a single drummer, stifles individu-
al initiative and sucks the oxygen out of community. We
seek other models. Diamond calls our attention to the
Netherlands, where rich and poor alike realized over the
years that they would have to collaborate on an extensive
system of dikes and pumps in order to reclaim the land
from the sea. 93 A large storm that took 2,000 lives in 1953
prompted the Dutch to redouble their efforts; a Dutch aca-
demician-friend of mine explains that the Deltawerken (the
massive reinforcement of the dykes and the damming of
some estuaries) stemmed in part from a "Churchillian feel-
ing that there was a war against the water, which required
sacrifices from all for a major effort to prevent any disaster
like that in the future." 94  Diamond quotes his Dutch
friend's description of life in the reclaimed lands, or "pold-
ers":
In the Netherlands, we have [an] expression,
'You have to be able to get along with your
enemy, because he may be the person operating
the neighboring pump in your polder.' And
For the legal consequences of the latter, see Her Majesty the Queen
v. Dudley, (1884) 14 Q.B.D 273 (D.C.).
93 DIAMOND, supra note 84.
94 E-mail from Wibren Van der Burg, Tilburg Univ., to author, (Feb.
11, 2007) (in author's files). The legendary British Prime Minister's
name was invoked to signify the gravity of this immense national
effort, led by "a reasonably effective government that saw itself as the
leading agency in rebuilding the country and a minimally just and
solidaristic society after WWII." Id.
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we're all down in the polders together. It's not
the case that rich people live safely up on tops
of the dikes while poor people live down in the
polder bottoms below sea level. If the dikes
and pumps fail, we'll all drown together .... If
global warming causes polar ice melting and a
world rise in sea level, the consequences will
be more severe for the Netherlands than for any
other country in the world, because so much of
our land is already under sea level. That's why
we Dutch are so aware of our environment.
We've learned through our history that we're
all living in the same polder, and that our sur-
vival depends on each other's survival. 95
Comments Diamond:
That acknowledged interdependence of all
segments of Dutch society contrasts with cur-
rent trends in the United States, where wealthy
people increasingly seek to isolate themselves
from the rest of society, aspire to create their
own separate virtual polders, use their own
money to buy services for themselves privately,
and vote against taxes that would extend those
amenities as public services to everyone else.
Those private amenities include living inside
gated communities, relying on private security
guards instead of the police, sending one's
children to well-funded private schools with
small classes rather than to the under-funded
crowded public schools, purchasing private
health insurance or medical care, [and] drinking
bottled water instead of municipal water. . ..
Underlying such privatization is a misguided
95 DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 519-20.
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belief that the elite can remain unaffected by
the problems of society around them: the atti-
tude of those Greenland Norse chiefs who
found that they had merely bought themselves
the privilege of being the last to starve.
96
The collective effort in the Netherlands shaped an
environmentally conscious community in which capitalism
has nevertheless thrived more than in most places on
earth.97 That care for the collective good would be condu-
cive to a thriving capitalist economy should not really come
as a surprise. Indeed, no lesser proponent of capitalism
than Adam Smith recognized long ago that
[n]o society can surely be flourishing and
happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable. It is but
equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe,
and lodge the whole body of the people,
should have such a share of the produce of
their own labour as to be themselves tolera-
bly well fed, clothed, and lodged. 98
As we shall see, however, those who would promote indi-
vidual initiative and an equitable distribution of resources
face special problems in the United States.
96 Id. at 520.
97 My Dutch friend explains that the polder boards may have been the
first democratic institutions in the Netherlands and account for the
country's egalitarian and democratic culture. Van der Burg, supra note
94.
98 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1776).
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III. IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT GOVERNMENT ROLE.
A. A nation of tax protestors.
The United States of America is a nation founded
by tax protesters. The cry of the American Revolution was
"no taxation without representation"-a call for representa-
tive democracy at least as much as a revolt against taxes; a
political protest as much as a tax revolt. Nevertheless, anti-
tax, and with it, anti-government, sentiment is very much a
part of the national DNA. King George III and his troops
represented repressive government; ergo, government must
be inherently repressive.99 The centralization of power in
particular was to be avoided. Hence, a loose confederacy
of states was formed to succeed British imperial rule.
When that proved ineffectual, a federal government was
formed, in which constituent states would nevertheless
remain sovereign and retain many important government
powers. Government power was to be divided among gov-
ernments with different competencies (i.e., the "division of
powers" between the national government and the states);
within each government, "separation of powers" was to
keep any one branch from exercising too much power. A
Bill of Rights, setting forth individual civil liberties in the
form of limitations on government power (e.g., "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." 100), became an
important part of the constitution of the new republic.
Government was a necessary evil, but an evil nevertheless,
to be constrained and divided.
99 A variation on this type of thinking might be found in contemporary
Russia. Under Soviet rule, Russians were told that capitalism was
corrupt; capitalists were portrayed in caricature as greedy, dishonest,
and underhanded. With the decline and fall of communism, Russians
seem to have believed their propagandists and embraced the most
corrupt form of capitalism. The caricature has become the fact.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 45
The result was a country in which criticism, suspi-
cion, and even derision of government is regarded as patri-
otic. A special target of this derision is the central
government in Washington. Politicians from Thomas Jef-
ferson to George W. Bush have campaigned against Wash-
ington (the government, not the man, although there is
reason to believe that Jefferson secretly schemed against
the man as well' 0 1). Ronald Reagan built his political ca-
reer on the following idea: the problem is not solved by
government, the problem is government.
Anti-government sentiment is the exclusive domain
of neither the left nor the right. Democrats, like Jefferson
(author of the Kentucky Resolutions10 2), Madison (princip-
al drafter of the limited-powers Constitution), Jackson (foe
of the Bank of the United States), Bryan (the prairie popul-
ist), and Carter have dueled in anti-government rhetoric as
have Republicans like the Tafts (three of them), Coolidge
("the chief business of the American people is
ness" 103), Reagan, and the Bushes (again, three of them).
The rhetoric often takes on a populist, anti-lawyerly com-
plexion. Peanut farmers (Jimmy Carter) and bodybuilders-
cum-Hollywood celebrities (Arnold Schwarzenegger) re-
peatedly remind voters, during political campaigns that
they are neither lawyers nor politicians, as if professional
training in the law or a life of public service is a form of
taint. But American lawyers, too, regard it as their sacred
duty to protect citizens against government power. The
101 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 482-83 (Touchstone 2001).
102 The Kentucky Resolutions, like Madison's Virginia Resolutions,
stated a case for nullification of acts of Congress deemed unconstitu-
tional by the state legislatures. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolu-
tions, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1 JANUARY 1798 TO
31 JANUARY 1799 550-56 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003); WILLIAM J.
WATKINS, JR., RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE KEN-
TUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR LEGACY 170-71 (2004).
103 President Calvin Coolidge, Address to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors in Washington D.C. (Jan. 25, 1925).
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crusading attorney, in both fact and fiction-Clarence Dar-
row, Atticus Finch, Thurgood Marshall-is seen at his
heroic best when defending the criminally accused against
an abusive government or challenging unfair or discrimina-
tory government practices.
Even our national symbols have an anti-
government, rugged individualist aura about them. The
vigilant serpent of "Don't Tread on Me" fame was suc-
ceeded by a solitary eagle, a free-flying bird of prey, not a
pack animal like the wolf or a communitarian species like
the beaver (although Oregonians favor the latter). The
Father of Our Country, George Washington, is portrayed as
a Cincinnatus, disdainful of high office, eager to return to
the plow, accepting both a military commission and the
Presidency only with great reluctance. 104
Yet for all the bashing of government, we expect
government to perform when the chips are down. At one
time, apparently, it did. In the days following the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, with the city in ruins
and thousands left homeless, at least one citizen was moved
104 The myth is only partially correct. Washington did resist imperial
trappings and titles as President and established the two-term tradition
(ignored by Franklin Roosevelt, then codified in the Twenty-second
Amendment). But he was a master politician, inventing several gov-
ernment institutions that survive to this day, successfully balancing off
personalities as diverse and contentious as Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Adams, and fending off all sorts of challenges. As for his military
command, Washington showed up at the Continental Congress in 1775
dressed in full military officer regalia. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776,
49-50 (Simon & Schuster 2005). What could he have been suggesting?
To his credit, Washington established the appropriate image
for the general-cum-politician in America. Military leaders who have
obtained high political office in this country have been the modest, self-
effacing, peace-loving sorts who have seen war and wish not to revisit
its horrors. We tend to elect and admire the Washingtons, Grants,
Eisenhowers, and Powells, not the strutting, autocratic McClellands,
MacArthurs, Pattons, and LeMays. We run (as we should) from the
man-on-horseback, the Caesar, or Napolean who will sweep us off our
feet and lay waste to our liberties.
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to write, "Everything's ruined. But don't worry; govern-
ment is looking out." 105 The observation seems to have
been accurate. Federal troops, after some initial blunders,
soon thereafter brought relief to a homeless and stranded
population. Within ten days, a new trolley line was up and
running; the twenty-eight thousand buildings destroyed by
the quake would be replaced by 20,500 new ones within
three years. 10 6 Public and private resources combined to
build a new City by the Bay. Even a corrupt municipal
administration rose to the occasion.
The recent New Orleans experience stands in sharp
contrast. Even now, two years after Katrina, deliverance
seems almost as remote as in the days immediately follow-
ing the storm. As of yet, no clear-cut game plan or consen-
sus as to how to rebuild the city and its environs exists.
Instead, the Big Easy seems to be adrift. 107 Part of the
problem is a cacophony of interest groups unwilling to lay
their respective demands aside for the common good. But
a century of disillusionment has also driven American gov-
ernment from a "can do" to a "won't do" mentality. 108
Americans spend 350 days a year bashing govern-
ment, starving it of resources, at least in those areas in
105 PBS American Experience: The Great San Francisco Earthquake
(produced and directed by Tom Weidlinger), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/earthquake/filmmore/pt.html (Mar. 20,
2006).106 id.
107 A metaphor for this drift may be the shrimp boats washed ashore
during Katrina, which remained tangled in the trees in Gulf Coast
communities ten months later. Dan Barry, 100-Ton Symbols of a
Recovery Still Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al.
'0' Perhaps we are just sadder but wiser. During the "can-do govem-
ment" era of the New Deal, Americans from Franklin Roosevelt to
Woody Guthrie extolled the virtues of massive federal reclamation and
irrigation projects such as the Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams.
Today, we have come to recognize that an environmental price must be
paid for such "progress." We may have become less sure-headed and
more circumspect about such matters.
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which intervention might matter most. We spend the re-
maining two weeks deploring government's inability to
respond to the crisis of the moment: a hurricane in the Gulf,
landslides in California, wildfires in the Rockies, floods in
New England. Of course, few people really want the cessa-
tion of all government. Most societies have been formed
by people who recognized the need to band together to
protect common interests. Those societies quickly adopted
some sort of governance system. It may have been more or
less authoritarian in structure; it may have been more or
less oppressive to individual citizens or outsiders who come
into their midst; it may have been more or less tolerant of
free thinking or non-conformity on the part of individuals.
All too frequently, the broad common interests that created
the governing instrument in the first place have been aban-
doned in the course of rent-seeking efforts of individuals
and limited interest groups, or in selfish efforts to accumu-
late wealth or power on the part of individuals. Thus, in the
Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninism, a flawed, authoritarian
form of government that nevertheless had the welfare of the
masses as its core principle, quickly gave way to Stalinism,
a more oppressive form of Marxism whose chief aim
seemed to be the preservation in power of a totalitarian
leader. 109 In Africa, the promise of liberation from colonial
rule frequently turned sour, as despotic rulers plundered
national assets for personal gain. In America, the Republi-
can Party, an organization formed with the noblest of
aims-the curtailment of slavery and the enhancement of
opportunity-has lately fallen into the hands of a coalition
of corporate oligarchs and religious zealots, with adverse
consequences for the Republic.
110
109 These circumstances have been portrayed in an allegorical fashion in
literature. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Penguin
Group 1945).110 For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see generally KEvIN
PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY (2006).
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A Hobbesian view of the world would suggest that
this is the natural state of things. Under Thomas Hobbes'
philosophy, power is accumulated in a governing authority
because men would otherwise be at each other's throats.
Life is "nasty, brutish and short," and people willingly cede
whatever natural rights they possess in return for the pro-
tection of a leviathan who will shield them from external
and internal threats.111 Under this view, the pursuit of self-
interest on the part of the ruling oligarchy is but a deal
struck with the devil. Some crumbs might be thrown to the
populace, but its claim to civil liberties is abandoned in
favor of protection against the Hun, the Turk, the Bolshe-
viks, or Al-Qaeda. The more liberal Lockean view regards
things differently. According to John Locke, individuals
group together to serve their mutual interests, including
self-protection, but in doing so they retain certain basic
civil liberties. 112 These "natural rights" are not to be inter-
fered with by the governing powers; to the extent intrusions
are permitted, they must be balanced against civil liber-
ties. 113 The bombing of Pearl Harbor may justify war on
Japan, but it does not justify the internment of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry. Taxes may be collected and
people may be conscripted into military service, but the
government may not arbitrarily drag us from our homes at
night or beat confessions out of its citizens.
B. Rights and responsibilities.
Communitarians are apt to reject the authoritarian-
ism implicit in the Hobbesian view and are therefore more
likely to embrace the Lockean, "natural rights" view. But
communitarians will be quick to add that with rights come
111 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1 ch. 13 (1651).
112 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(1690).
13 Id.
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responsibilities, and that the assertion of individual rights
does not mean disregard for the needs of the community at
large. In America, however, the impulse against invasive
government power runs strong-so strong that we are re-
luctant to have government play the major role in promot-
ing social welfare that is taken for granted in most
economically advanced societies. Our health care system is
a prominent example of this phenomenon. Resistance to a
comprehensive national health care system has been articu-
lated on a number of grounds: the right to chose one's own
physician, the right of doctors to be independent contrac-
tors, the efficiencies and choices arguably provided by an
array of competing health insurance plans. But communi-
tarians are apt to downplay the "rights talk," recognizing,
as Mary Ann Glendon does, that most public controversies
are best resolved through an adjustment of competing inter-
ests. 114 Refraining the issue as an interests-based discus-
sion frees us to consider whether nationally-guaranteed
health coverage might benefit the nation as a whole and
whether a single-payer (or even just a single-form) health
insurance program might be more efficient than a system in
which each doctor must employ a cadre of specialists just
to process the forms required by a patchwork quilt of insur-
ers. Our Canadian neighbors enjoy universal health care 115
and more-more extensive public transportation,1 16 large
subsidies for higher education, 117 and stacks of firewood
free for the taking in national parks. Nevertheless, my
occasional forays to the north have unearthed no sense of
114 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 15 (1991).
115 Judy Foreman, Why Canadians Are Healthier, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 10, 2004, at C2.
116 Michael R. Baltes, The Importance Customers Place on Specific
Service Elements of Bus Rapid Transit, 6 J. OF PUB. TRANSP. 1, 5, 18
(2003).
117 Martin Trow, From Mass Higher Education to Universal Access:
The American Advantage, 37 MINERVA 303, 304, 317-319 (1999).
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oppression or restraint of freedom on the part of Canadian
citizens. Perhaps the absence of the responsibilities of a
superpower-and the hubris that goes with it-provides
our Canadian neighbors with an air of freedom and a lighter
step to their feet. Or perhaps it is a stronger sense of com-
munity that allows them to recognize that health care is a
universal need, the availability of which should be depen-
dent upon neither wealth nor employment status.
C. The tragedy of the commons.
Communitarian theory suggests that when possible,
government responsibility should be vested in the smallest
units, as they are most likely to be responsive to the needs
of the community. 118 But communitarianism sometimes
requires broader government responsibility as to human
needs. In America, the impulse against centralization of
government power runs almost as strong as the antipathy
toward government in general. Whether our federal system
is the cause or the effect of resistance to central authority,
there is great reluctance to place the federal government in
charge of many aspects of public life that are entrusted to
central authority in other countries. School finance is a
prominent example of this phenomenon. In France (to cite
just one case), public education is regarded as a major re-
sponsibility of the central government. 119 Approximately
two-thirds of all school funding comes out of Paris, and the
quality of one's education is not a by-product of the wealth
of one's hometown. 20  In America, the regard for local
control is strong. Control over and financing of schools is
118 AMrrAI ETZIONI, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights
and Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNrrY: RIGHTS, RESPON-
SIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 260 (1993).
119 Embassy of France in the United States, Education in France: The
School System, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/edu-fr.asp (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).120 id.
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 52
largely a local matter. 121 The state might take some inter-
est, but Washington is banished to the far comers of public
education. 122 The quality and type of education one rece-
ives in America thereby becomes largely a function of the
wealth and attitudes of one's local community-and the
results, of late, have been deplorable. 123
They have been deplorable at least in part because
many localities-even many that could not be considered
''poor" by any means-starve their public school systems.
This starvation subsists because while the greatest carping
about government power, size, and expenditures is reserved
for the federal government, people have the most direct
influence over taxes and expenditures on the local level. In
some states, like New York and New Jersey, voters must
approve school budgets through direct referendum. 124
Elsewhere, a school board member is only a telephone call
121 Some exceptions exist. Hawaii, for example, fmances all public
education through the state treasury. See Haw. Const. art. 10, § 1. See
generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1303 (Supp. 2006) (articulating
how the school budget and general fund are estimated).
122 Washington's primary involvement appears to be in the form of
unfunded mandates: decrees that states and local school districts must
comply with certain requirements as a condition for federal funding,
then paltry appropriations with respect to such funding. One such
example can be found in provisions for special education for students
with disabilities. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Im-
provement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004);
see also No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat. 1425 (2002).12 3 See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMER-
ICA'S SCHOOLS 3-5 (1992) (detailing inequities in America's public
schools). In Chile, students, who are painfully aware of such inequi-
ties, have recently taken to the streets in opposition to a Pinochet-era
law that delegates education funding to local communities and private
enterprise. See Larry Rohter, Chileans Promised a New Deal: Now
Striking Youth Demand It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2006, at Al 1. Thus, an
avowedly socialist government has fallen short of the egalitarian ideal.124 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 13-17 (West 1999); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
2022 -2023 (McKinney 2000).
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away-and unlike the congressional representative, she is
likely to answer the phone personally. The tragedy of the
commons takes hold, as elderly and childless voters, not
seeing a direct stake in the education of young people, rail
against high taxes, "bloated" school budgets, and "overpa-
id" teachers. 125 Having little recourse over state and federal
budgets, they use what leverage they can to control expend-
itures at the local level.
For decades, America's public schools were subsi-
dized by the practice of sex discrimination. Women, large-
ly excluded from professions such as law and medicine,
turned to nursing and teaching, for which they (and the
smaller number of males who opted for these callings)
accepted wages that would have been below market in a
truly free market, i.e., a market free of discrimination.
Now, with the more lucrative professions open to women,
the private-sector nursing market has begun to pay com-
petitive wages. 126 Teachers, most of whom work in a pub-
licly-financed school system, continue to earn depressed
wages. The profession is gradually depleted of its best
talent, who seek more lucrative positions elsewhere. To
extend the commons analogy, it now costs more to grow
the grass, but the public is unwilling to recognize the scar-
city of seed and foot the bill.
What is lacking here is a broad sense of community.
Last year my new research assistant, recently exposed to
communitarianism, asked me how broadly we can define
community. A core question, to be sure. With respect to
some interests, it might be altogether appropriate to define
one's community as narrowly as one's immediate family,
121 The tragedy of the commons takes hold when a public resource (i.e.,
the commons) is depleted because individuals are unwilling to regulate
their use or pay the price necessary to sustain the resource. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
126 Cheryl L. Mee, Salary, NURSING 2005, Oct. 2005, at 46, 48.
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or one's church, or one's neighborhood. 127 But some func-
tions (and I would contend that education is one of them)
require the financial commitment of an entire nation. For
still other purposes, such as the environment, our concerns
are that of a global community. In matters such as educa-
tion and the environment our interests are so interwoven
that it is, in the long run, just as self-defeating to narrow
one's perspective to one's family or even one's town as it
was for the Norse chiefs described by Diamond to horde
Greenland's scarce resources. 128
The problems of health care and public education
have together come to a head in my local school district.
Our local teachers worked last year without a contract, and
our little town endured a short strike, because the school
board insisted that the teachers contribute more of their
own funds to their health insurance plan.129 While a con-
tribution in the amount demanded by the board was un-
precedented for our area's public schools, the squeeze is
not unlike those faced by any number of employers, locally
and nationally. General Motors, Delta Airlines, Wal-Mart,
and our local grocer and automobile mechanic all must face
rising health care premiums while selling goods and servic-
es in a competitive environment. In America, the mix of
public and private resources has generally served us well,
but an over-reliance on employers as the major source of
health insurance has crippled them against international
competition, subjected them (like our doctors) to increasing
amounts of red tape, and exacerbated labor strife all over
America. Greater recognition of public and national re-
sponsibility in this regard may not only make health care
accessible to all; it might allow Americans to get on with
127 ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND
COMMuNY: THE CASE OF TORTS 5 (2004).
128 DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 248-76.
129 Full disclosure requires me to note that my wife is one of our local
school teachers.
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business in a more globally competitive manner. Only our
distaste for "big government" stands in the way.
D. "Painless" solutions.
Some of the rancor in our own school district is a
product of uncertainty regarding the future of Pennsylva-
nia's system of public school finance. Recent experience
in that area provides some contrasts of particular interest to
communitarians. For the past several years, a Democratic
governor and a Republican legislature have tangled over a
funding scheme that would employ gambling proceeds
from slot-machines to reduce the tax burden. This "pain-
less" approach to public finance works as a regressive tax
on the poor and hides the true cost of government services.
Rarely mentioned is the moral question of whether we
should finance our children's education through a blue-
smoke-and-mirrors scheme dependent upon gambling
money drawn disproportionately from a low-income clien-
tele.
A more communitarian approach to school finance
is demonstrated by a program adopted by some fourteen
Pennsylvania school districts. These districts accept in-
kind services from senior citizens in lieu of taxes. 130 Se-
niors serve as teachers' aides, lunchroom monitors, cross-
ing guards, and tutors in exchange for tax forgiveness. The
need for tax relief on the part of skilled, public-spirited
citizens on fixed incomes is matched with the schools'
needs for a variety of services that might otherwise not be
provided. And, as Robert Putnam suggests in Bowling
130 Madelyn Pennino, Young and old, learning-Retirees tutor at
school's 'lab', INTELLIGENCER J., Jan. 28, 2008, at B 1; Dena Pauling,
Seniors Who Volunteer May Get $500 Tax Break, Aging Homeowners
Could be Paid for Work, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Sept. 16, 200, at 1.
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Alone, the direct engagement of these citizens provides
value in a way that mere check-writing cannot. 131
IV. RECURRENT COMMUNITARIAN THEMES.
We can no longer delude ourselves with sugar-
coated facts, "painless" solutions, or other blue-smoke-and-
mirrors exercises, nor will the old partisan rhetoric or "left
versus right" labels suffice. Instead, we must begin to
consider the role of government with maturity and honesty.
Throughout this essay, we have encountered a number of
communitarian themes that can help us address this issue in
a principled manner, unencumbered by conventional politi-
cal rhetoric or alignments. 132 They may be summarized as
follows:
A. How much government?
This essay opened with the sad examples of Katrina
and Chernobyl, because they demonstrate the unfortunate
results that can be obtained from two extreme philosophies
of government: that of too much and of not enough gov-
ernment. We must ask: How much government is enough?
To what purposes is government legitimately and most
effectively employed? At what point does government
intervention intrude too dearly on civil liberties? When is
economic development and human progress best left to
private enterprise?
131 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND RE-
VIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 116 (2000).
132 Using new language to confront problems can free us from doctrinal
rhetoric and ancient commitments, but it can be disturbing to those who
seek comfort in familiar labels. George Gershwin's masterpiece, Porgy
and Bess, confounded critics, because they did not know how to cha-
racterize a unique operatic composition for the Broadway stage about
African-Americans by a Jewish-American composer of popular music
and show tunes.
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Traditionally, this inquiry has been framed as a ten-
sion between individual liberties and public welfare, with
the implication that whatever balance we strike, we are
dealing with a zero-sum game. Politically, this tension
often reduces to a superficial left/right struggle, with those
on the left generally arguing for greater government inter-
vention to promote the general welfare and those on the
right suggesting that overall welfare is best advanced by
limiting state intervention and maximizing individual liber-
ty and initiative. When the discussion turns to national
defense and security issues, however, the roles are, more
often than not, reversed in American political discourse,
with conservatives tending to defer to government preroga-
tives to promote security for all and liberals suggesting, as
Benjamin Franklin did, that "Tho[s]e who would give up
ESSENTIAL LIBERTY to purcha[s]e a little TEMPORARY
SAFETY, de[s]erve neither LIBERTY nor SAFETY." 133
As a general philosophy, communitarians reject
both the extremes of radical individualism and repressive
authoritarianism. In the words of Amitai Etzioni, the
communitarian movement's founder, "A Communitarian
perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and
the social dimension of human existence." 134 Thus, while
government power is to be constrained by individual civil
liberties, government is nevertheless respected as a vehicle
(but not the exclusive vehicle) for social organization, as is
the need for some government intrusion in furtherance of
the greater good, be it in the form of taxes, military con-
scription, economic regulation or, where warranted,
searches of private persons and property. While govern-
ment is neither the exclusive nor even necessarily the best
means of promoting social welfare, communitarians recog-
133 See ROBERT JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759) (quotation appears
on the title page and is widely attributed to Ben Franklin).
134 AMITAI ETZIONI, supra note 118, at 253.
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nize that it plays an essential role in this endeavor. In this
regard, communitarians do not feel obliged to adhere to the
political orthodoxies of the left or the right. And while
most communitarians would assert that all persons possess
certain natural rights, we recognize that most conflict situa-
tions call for a mutual adjustment of interests, rather than a
contest as to whose rights trump those of others. 1
35
A communitarian view calls for neither government
abdication nor totalitarianism. At certain times and with
respect to certain ventures, government plays a necessary
and critical role, be it contending with a major hurricane,
defending the nation against terrorism, or educating our
young people. Sometimes it takes a village-or a state, or
a nation-to perform tasks essential to sustained existence
and development. The quandary is in determining just how
much government intervention is necessary to create oppor-
tunities for individuals to thrive, without stifling the initia-
tive of those same individuals. Across-the-board bromides
and political sloganeering do us little good here. Rather, a
healthy dose of pragmatism is in order. Delineating the
limits of government intervention and responsibility, con-
sistent with notions of communitarianism, is a core inquiry
necessary to the resolution of a multitude of problems we
face in a changing world.
B. How much law?
An issue closely related to that of the extent of gov-
ernment intervention is how much law is needed to de-
scribe the parameters of that intervention. Our agenda will
sometimes require structural reforms or other legislation.
Universal health insurance and environmental regulation
(including even market-based regulation, such as a carbon
tax) require statutory measures to take hold. Many such
reforms, because of the complexity of the problems they
135 GLENDON, supra note 114, at 18-19.
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seek to address, will additionally require administrative
regulations for their implementation. Congress may enact a
carbon tax and might even include in such legislation a rate
of taxation, but it would remain for an administrative agen-
cy to determine how much carbon, subject to the tax, is
emitted from any given activity (or at least determine a way
of measuring it). Because many of our adjustments are
subtle, the scalpel will sometimes be more effective than
the meat cleaver. Garrett Hardin said several decades ago,
"Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to
enforce); but how do we legislate temperance? Experience
indicates that it can be accomplished best through the med-
iation of administrative law." 1
36
But as Hardin acknowledged, administrative law "is
rightly feared for an ancient reason-Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?-'Who shall watch the watchers them-
selves? ' '" 137 Indeed, more often than not, taking responsi-
bility requires not more law, but more responsible
administration of existing law. Hardin continued, "The
great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective
feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We
must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both
the custodians and the corrective feedbacks."'' 38
Ultimately, more responsible administration of ex-
isting law will occur only through the active engagement of
the citizenry. Congress can enact a ban on budgetary ear-
marks; it can just as easily revoke the ban. 139 Congress can
create FEMA to respond to disasters; it can also continue to
confirm the appointment of inept FEMA directors. A vigi-
136 Hardin, supra note 125, at 1246.
137 d. at 1245-46.
131 Id. at 1246.
139 Apparently, divided government in and of itself does not guaranty
prudence. A supposedly reform-minded Democratic Congress, purpor-
tedly committed to eliminating earmarks, nevertheless managed to
insert a few into its first budget in 2007. Robert Pear, Select Hospitals
Reap a Windfall Under Child Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at Al.
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 60
lant public, aided by the press, is the best insurance against
lapses in official morality and competence. In this regard,
the solution is more often political rather than legal.
A generation of Americans (and in particular,
American lawyers) has seen how the courts in dramatic
cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,14 1 have ef-
fected major transitions in society. As a consequence,
many of us have adopted a post-Brown mentality, in which
recourse to reformist litigation is seen as a cure-all for the
nation's ills. We should continue to avail ourselves of the
courts and the Constitution to preserve human rights. The
rights secured under Brown were critical to a nation that
needed to rid itself of the oppression of an apartheid sys-
tem. But breakthrough cases like Brown, signaling a major
reordering of society, come by about once in a lifetime.
When the debate is more appropriately framed as an ad-
justment of interests, rather than as a competition among
rights, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
becomes the proper forum for decision-making. No writ of
mandamus will make Michael Brown a competent FEMA
Director; no judicial directive will craft a wise foreign
policy. The Supreme Court might declare the regulation of
greenhouse gases within EPA jurisdiction, 141 but the EPA
must still carry out the Court's mandate. Judicial and legis-
lative remedies can take us only so far. The body politic
must demand more of its elected and appointed employees.
C. The role of civil society.
Perhaps equally important as government to the
building and sustaining of community is the role of private
organizations and institutions. What political scientists call
"civil society"-a tapestry of voluntary associations such
as civic clubs, neighborhood organizations, corporations,
140 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
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labor unions, religious institutions, charitable organizations,
educational institutions, and even Putnam's bowling lea-
gues-plays a vital role in creating and maintaining the
social capital that allows societies to thrive. Sometimes
(and in some societies), these organizations stand in oppo-
sition to government authority, but in democracies, these
organizations usually act in tandem with government, as
mediating elements through which individuals join together
for social or economic action. "[C]ivil society [is] the
space between the individual and the state, the area where
private institutions, voluntary associations, free markets,
the free expression of ideas, and the free exercise of reli-
gion can be imagined or realized." 142 Voluntary and auto-
nomous organizations "not only mediate between the
individual and the state, ... they also help make the 'life of
a society more full, rich, and varied."'
' 143
In his book, Better Together, Robert Putnam docu-
ments the efforts of a variety of community organizations
to improve the lot of the citizenry. 144 The organizations are
engaged in a variety of efforts: economic development,
neighborhood improvement, and literacy, to name a few.
For the most part, they involve grass-roots structures, or-
ganizations built from the ground up to deal with an identi-
fied problem or serve an identified clientele. While few of
these organizations are government agencies per se, almost
all of them use government as a means of advancing their
mission. While in some regimes, civil society must act as a
"parallel polis," in opposition to the state (e.g., the Solidari-
ty movement in Communist Poland), that need not be the
case in a democracy. "The civil society does not act in
opposition to the democratic state, but cooperates with
142 W. Robert Connor, The Idea of a Civil Society, Conference Intro-
duction 2 (National Humanities Center 1992).143 Id. at 2-3 (quoting Anne Firor Scott).
'44 ROBERT PUTNAM, BETTER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN
COMMUNIrrY (2003).
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it."' 145 Even in a democracy, however, civil society can
play a useful monitoring function. We should consider
how civil society may complement or supplant government
with respect to certain activities, recognizing that many
functions are best performed by voluntary associations that
lack some of the constraints, as well as the coercive power,
of government.
D. What level of government should intervene?
When government intervention is appropriate, at
what level should it intervene? As a general proposition,
communitarians would advocate government intervention
and regulation by the smallest governmental unit and at the
most local level possible. 146  The smallest governmental
units are most likely to be most responsive to immediate
needs and most likely to invoke the direct participation of
the individuals involved, thus wedding responsive govern-
ment to individual responsibility. We should be wary of
those projects (like Alaska's Bridge to Nowhere) conceived
to meet purely local "needs" but which the locals are unwil-
ling to fund on their own. 147 But some needs (the most
obvious of which is national defense) are so overwhelming
and universal so as to require governmental response on a
larger, more national scale. Some needs are intermediate in
nature. Should the federal government respond to a hurri-
cane that has displaced thousands, or should the people of
New Orleans, or St. Charles Parish, or Louisiana, or Mis-
sissippi be left to respond on their own? What are the geo-
145 Bronislaw Geremek, Civil Society and the Present Age, in THE IDEA
OF A CIVIL SOCIETY 11, 18 (1992), available at
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/publications/civilsoc/geremek.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
46 ETZIONI, supra note 118.
147 We should differentiate between such projects and those essential
functions such as education that address national needs but which some
localities are unable to fully fund.
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graphic dimensions of our "community"? Do they change
depending upon the circumstances addressed and the type
of intervention required? Does geography remain essential,
or is it even relevant to our definition of community in an
age of jet travel and electronic communications?
In the United States and some other countries, the
issue of the appropriate level of government response is
complicated by the principle of federalism, in which certain
entities (most notably, states and Indian tribes) are sove-
reigns with powers derived from sources other than the
central government. An American state or (to cite another
federal republic) German Land stands in a different rela-
tionship to the central authority in Washington or Berlin
than a French department or Chinese province has with
respect to Paris or Beijing. Does it make sense to regard
political subdivisions as sovereign units, or is this a matter
that should have been resolved definitively in the American
Civil War? Is a matter like public education (to cite just
one important example) a responsibility of each locality (as
in most of the United States), or is it regarded as a respon-
sibility of the much larger community embodied in the state
(as in France)?
E. Individual responsibility.
A fifth communitarian theme of interest to us is that
of personal versus institutional responsibility. Some activi-
ties justify government intervention and regulation; with
respect to others, we are better off taking responsibility for
ourselves. Should the government regulate, for example,
the extraction of natural resources from environmentally
fragile lands, or should we leave it to the judgment and
altruism of corporations engaged in the exploitation of non-
renewable mineral resources to serve as stewards of the
environment? Should the government regulate the market-
ing of junk food to toddlers (as the New York Times advo-
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cated in a 2006 editorial148), or should we leave it to parents
to act responsibly and monitor the dietary intake of their
children? Must the State of California subsidize protection
from mudslides for coastal communities, or should people
be left to decide whether they will themselves pay the price
of living in a dangerous environment (through exposure to
danger or the cost of protection), while enjoying the bene-
fits of an ocean view? Reasonable people will disagree
about these issues; in the very least, we should try to devel-
op a framework for their principled consideration, rather
than defaulting to "squeaky-wheel-gets-the-grease" no-
strums.
As a point of departure, I would suggest that the
case for individual, rather than collective, responsibility is
inversely correlated to the impact of one's conduct on oth-
ers. The dietary intake of one's children, for example, has
an impact that is far more localized than that of drilling for
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Common sense,
as well as respect for individual liberties, suggests that
certain decisions-and the responsibility that goes with
them-should be the province of the smallest community
unit, the family. But that does not grant us license to ignore
the sufferings of others or the interconnectedness of hu-
manity. A broad range of human concerns demands our
engagement. We can isolate ourselves from neither geno-
cide in Darfur nor the implications of global climate
change.
F. Responsible intervention.
A related theme is the government's need to act
responsibly on our collective behalf. I have alluded earlier
to the problem of resorting to "painless" solutions to public
problems, like the accumulation of a growing amount of
148 Editorial, Selling Junk Food to Toddlers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2006, at A26.
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public debt in lieu of raising taxes. These solutions are
really not painless at all, as they merely postpone the day of
reckoning and force members of the next generation to pay
for commitments their parents have made. Even those of
us who are so cautious as to minimize our personal debt
(more and more a rarity in our debt-obsessed culture) are
forced to take on our share of the public debt. Pay-as-you-
go strategies, on the other hand, have the additional benefit
of requiring the decision-maker to count the cost. 149 If a
war (on Iraq or on poverty) is not worth paying for, is it
really worth fighting? 150
Related to this inquiry is that of internalization of
costs. With respect to both public and private courses of
action, is it possible to internalize costs in such a way that
the actors pay the full price of their activities, including the
costs they might impose on others in the absence of regula-
tion? For example, might Americans become more prudent
in their consumption of non-renewable, carbon-based fuels,
and more frequently avail themselves of public transporta-
tion, if the environmental costs of driving were fully incor-
porated into the cost of gasoline? Market-based solutions,
such as the carbon tax, promote responsible decision-
making by making actors-be they individuals, corporate
bodies, or governments-count the costs. The role of gov-
ernment here becomes the proper assessment and enforce-
ment of the true costs of carbon use and emissions, so as to
eliminate the freeloader phenomenon that occurs when
149 The same case can be made for localization of decision making, and
the funding necessary to support it. If the potential users of an Alaskan
bridge-to-nowhere are unwilling to pay for it, why should Washington?
150 The "other people's money" problem discussed in the preceding
note finds its analogy in the war-making context, specifically the ex-
penditure of other people's lives. If we make war, we should be willing
to place our own lives at risk, not just those of the poor.
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people are allowed to impose costs on others without pay-
ing the freight. 1
51
G. Regard for long-term consequences.
A corollary to the theme of responsibility is due re-
gard for the long-term consequences of one's actions, be
they private or public. While little of the communitarian
literature to date has focused on this theme, its relationship
to communitarianism is apparent. The following acts are
among those consistent with the theme of responsibility: to
pay one's own debts, to clean up one's own messes, and to
leave one's surroundings for the better, not the worse, for
one's having been here. Annual federal budget deficits
mean that someone else will have to pay for today's felt
necessities. Economic stimulants and foreign adventures
may be priorities, but previous generations fought two
world wars and a depression during the first half of the
twentieth century without encumbering us with a fraction
of the debt we now propose to pass on to our heirs. Envi-
ronmental responsibility may be of even greater impor-
tance, as the effects of environmental degradation can be
permanent in ways that deficits need not be. We cannot
dredge the Mississippi, mine the canyon lands of Utah, fill
the air with hydrocarbons, or contribute to the demise of
hundreds of other species without contemplating the conse-
quences. The old Native American saying holds true: The
land is not a gift from our ancestors; it is a loan from our
children.
Al Gore (who has long warned about the peril of
global warming) has suggested that "[w]hat changed in the
151 Government does this with regularity through the tort liability sys-
tem by making the courts available to people for redress against those
who have harmed them A carbon tax is a superior device in that it
carries with it a formulaic consistency and fairness not associated with
jury verdicts. It should incorporate the cost of resource depletion as
well as the cost of pollution.
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U.S. with Hurricane Katrina was a feeling that we have
entered a period of consequences."1 52 But public responsi-
bility for large-scale consequences has always been a more
difficult concept to embrace than that of individual respon-
sibility. Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the politics
of the day is the failure to account for the future conse-
quences of present-day policy. We plunge trillions of dol-
lars into debt, mortgaging our children's future to the
central banks of East Asia. We turn a blind eye toward
global warming, ascribing the threat to "junk science." We
commence a war on Iraq, declaring "mission accom-
plished," without contemplating the difficult occupation
that lies ahead.
What the first President Bush derisively referred to
as "the vision thing" may be the greatest deficit in current
formulations of public policy. Critics of the second Bush
Administration's environmental policies suggest that its
links to corporate America have caused it to place greed
above the common good. 153 But it may not be so much that
Bush and his loyalists are greedy; they may simply lack the
foresight to comprehend the long-term consequences of
their actions. During the Reagan Administration, Interior
Secretary James Watt's seeming disregard for the environ-
ment was attributed (probably unfairly) to an apocalyptic
vision: the long-term prospects for the environment were
thought to be of no consequence, because the physical
environment was about to be destroyed by the hand of
God. 154 An other-worldly view of things may similarly
affect current policies.
152AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006).
153 See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: How
GEORGE W. BUSH AND His CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE
COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY 190-99 (2004); PHILLIPS,
supra note 110.
15 See Phillips, supra note 110 at 63. Phillips suggests that Watt's
concern about an imminent Second Coming justified, in his mind,
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 68
Alternatively, the lack of vision may have more
mundane explanations. The problem with the Katrina re-
sponse may have been similar to the recurring complaint
about the Pentagon-that our generals are always fighting
the last battle. In the post-9/11 period, the government
installed a vast and inconvenient security apparatus to pro-
tect the homeland from the last threat-that of terrorists
flying airplanes into skyscrapers-and neglected the next
one-an environmental calamity, caused by terrorists or
natural causes. Mother Nature may have treated us to Ka-
trina; the poisoning of urban drinking water or the unleash-
ing of a "dirty bomb" in some major metropolitan area may
be the next surprise Al-Qaeda has cooked up for us. In-
deed, people are working on this critical issue, but it does
not appear that our government has attached the urgency or
resources to the issue that it deserves. 1
55
It is not as if the party out of power excels at long-
term planning. If the Republicans have a time horizon of
about one month, the Democrats often seem to have a hori-
zon of seventy-five years-into the past. But efforts to
depart from this mind-set have produced mixed results.
Over a decade ago, in an effort to fashion a "third way,"
Clinton-era Democrats joined market-minded Republicans
in rejecting protectionism and embracing free trade. But by
failing to insist that our trading partners adopt measures to
protect labor and the environment, we may have placed our
own industries and workers at a disadvantage while exacer-
bating environmental degradation and exploitation of labor
in other parts of the world.
The traditional liberal nostrums of redistribution
and regulation have merit in some circumstances. Vast and
better stewardship of natural resources in anticipation of that reckon-
ing.
155 See Steve Coil, The Unthinkable: Can the United States Be Made
Safe from Nuclear Terrorism?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2007, at
48.
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still-growing disparities in wealth (and access to it) may
justify the former, and environmental imperatives may
require the latter. Not all solutions can be market-based.
But solutions that internalize externalities (e.g., by using a
carbon tax to incorporate environmental costs into prices)
may produce the most efficient results and remain largely
untried. Such solutions combine the best elements of the
conservative obsession with markets and the liberal infatua-
tion with regulation. 
156
The Dutch polder experience in the years following
World War II demonstrates how disparate political parties,
religious groups, and economic interests can unite for the
common good and address pressing needs. We must rec-
ognize that current security, environmental, and fiscal de-
mands are, like those that demanded the Dutch polder
effort, an existential matter. To confront these demands, a
new politics of community and responsibility must replace
the old partisan bickering. As Lincoln said in another era,
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high
with difficulty, and we must rise with the occa-
sion. As our case is new, so we must think
156 Compare Clean Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
passed by House), and Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and
Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
amended and passed by Senate) (encompassing a variety of regulatory
measures, such as more stringent automobile mileage regulations), with
Robert B. Reich, The Best Idea for Reducing Global Warming, THE
AM. PROSPECT, June 20, 2007, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article--the-best-idea-for-reducing
__global-warming_ (advocating cap-and-trade approach), and Interview
by Scott Jagow with Robert Reich, Professor of Public Policy at the
University of California at Berkley (June 20, 2007) (advocating carbon
tax).
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anew and act anew. We must disenthrall our-
selves, and then we shall save our country. 
157
H. Being a good neighbor.
The final communitarian theme we should address
is the importance of behaving as good neighbors. Being a
good neighbor means more than conforming to that which
is legally required. A focus on legal rights alone ignores
the informal relationships and voluntary undertakings that
are essential to the societal fabric. "Buried deep in our
rights dialect," writes communitarian Mary Ann Glendon,
"is an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land
of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligations
toward others except to avoid the active infliction of
harm." 158 It would be a sad land indeed if we regarded our
obligations to others as merely congruent with our legal
obligations and failed to recognize our interdependence.
Compare, if you will, the defensive, fearful post-Katrina
response of the officials of Gretna, Louisiana (who barred
dislocated New Orleans residents from their streets) with
that of their counterparts in Houston, Texas. By opening
their public facilities, their schools, and their arms to those
displaced by Katrina, Houston's citizens may have momen-
tarily diluted their material resources, but they built a price-
less store of social capital from which they are likely to
reap returns for years to come.
The same notion of "neighborliness" may be at-
tached to international affairs. In his recent book, From
Empire to Community, Amitai Etzioni envisions a transition
from a "might makes right" philosophy in foreign relations
to the development of institutions and communal bonds to
157 Abraham Lincoln, The President's State of the Union Address to
Congress (Dec. 1, 1862).
158 GLENDON, supra note 114, at 77.
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establish human primacy. 159  Gunboat diplomacy and
bombing raids may provide temporary gains, but in an age
of global terrorism, real security is obtained only through
collaboration.
Determining the parameters of effective govern-
ment action, recognizing both the potency and limitations
of law, delineating the boundary between public and pri-
vate, defining the role of civil society, discerning the re-
spective roles of governments at different levels, acting
responsibly, planning for the future, and caring for our
neighbors: these are considerations that can frame prin-
cipled discussion. As events from Chernobyl to Katrina
have demonstrated, these issues are too important to be
dispatched with familiar labels or partisan rhetoric. We
must honestly acknowledge inconvenient facts, engage in
principled discourse, and recognize that our future depends
on a web of relationships and the enlightened employment
of governance mechanisms.
To some, the principles suggested in this essay will
appear naive. Self-interest dominates human endeavor, the
public-choice theorists would say, and to profess otherwise
is wishful thinking worthy only of Pollyanna or Candide.
Government can never be trusted, the cynics warn us. But
disaster lies in the unmitigated pursuit of self-interest, just
as surely as it lies in the unfettered power of government.
The consequences of heedless pursuit of selfish ends at one
extreme, or of forfeiture of all initiative to government at
the other, are too dire, and furnish no realistic vision of a
livable future. Better for us to seek a proper balance, to
build community, and to trust what Lincoln called "the
better angels of our nature."' 6
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159 AM1TAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNrrYpassim (2004).
160 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
